

**HISTORICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND SOCIOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS OF  
THE SHARIA ENFORCEMENT STRUGGLE BY THE KPSI IN SOUTH  
SULAWESI****Ahmad Faisal**IAIN Sultan Amai Gorontalo  
ahmadfaisal@iaingorontalo.ac.id**Abstract**

This article analyses the historical and philosophical-sociological arguments of the struggle for the enforcement of Islamic law by the Islamic Sharia Enforcement Committee (KPPSI). Historically, proponents supporting KPPSI believe that the idea of the Shari'a struggle has strong historical roots in this area. The same goes for philosophical and sociological arguments. The arguments underlying the desire to enforce Islamic law are largely and normatively justified. However, this study has found out that there is no political situation that can be interpreted as a fundamental justification for demanding the idea makes the idea still a discourse. In fact, the struggle within KPSI's direction pursued through political mechanisms too, with the demand for a legal umbrella in the form of special autonomy. Therefore, the idea of the enforcement of Islamic law, the author argues, seems to be less popular.

**Keywords:** *Historical, Philosophical-sociological, Enforcement of Sharia, Shouth Sulawesi.*

**Abstrak**

Artikel ini membahas argumen historis dan filosofis-sosiologis perjuangan penegakan syariat Islam oleh Komite Penegakan Syariat Islam (KPSI). Secara historis, komponen pendukung KPPSI meyakini bahwa ide perjuangan syariat memiliki akar historis yang kuat di daerah ini. Begitu pula argumen filosofis dan sosiologis. Tetapi, meskipun benar bahwa argumen-argumen yang mendasari keinginan untuk memberlakukan syariat Islam itu sebagian besarnya dapat dibenarkan secara normatif, namun kenyataan bahwa secara politik tidak terdapat situasi yang dapat diinterpretasikan sebagai alasan pembenar yang mendasar untuk menuntut gagasan itu, menjadikan gagasan tersebut masih sebatas wacana. Apalagi, jika kemudian perjuangan ke arah itu ditempuh lewat mekanisme politik dengan tuntutan adanya payung hukum berupa otonomi khusus, maka tampaknya gagasan tersebut terasa kurang populer.

**Kata kunci:** *Historis, Filosofis-sosiologis, Penegakan syariat Islam, Sulawesi Selatan.*

## Introduction

Ideologically-theologically, Muslims believe in the holistic nature of Islam. Some people even believe that Islam includes a total way of life, which later the body is stated in the Shari'a. Therefore, for some Muslims, Islamic law is believed to be a unified totality, which offers a solution to all the problems of life.<sup>1</sup>

One of the implications of such a holistic view is the birth of a tendency to understand Islamic law literally. In fact, in reality, such a trend has been developed so far that it gave birth to a tendency to emphasize the legal and formal aspects of the idealism of Islamic teachings. For this reason, in the context of history, it is not too surprising if groups and trends emerge among the Muslim community who want to base their entire social, economic and political framework on Islamic teachings exclusively.<sup>2</sup>

The desire to uphold Islamic law, both through political channels and legal constitutions and through physical struggles against the legitimate government, has become part of a long history of the struggle of Muslims in Indonesia.<sup>3</sup> Whether it was by chance or not, in fact, the forms of thought and practice developed by thinkers and activists supporting the idea of upholding Islamic law are always thick with legalistic and formalistic nuances.

The fall of the New Order regime on May 21, 1998, seemed to provide an opportunity again for the emergence of old ideas, such as those that were developed in the 1940s to the 1960s. For this reason, in the amendment process of the 1945 Constitution that began in the 1999 General Session of the MPR and the 2000 Annual Session of the

---

<sup>1</sup> As an expression of such beliefs, some Muslims hold that Islamic law includes three "d" namely: *din* (religion); *dunya* (the world); and *dawlah* (the state), see Nazih Ayyubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the World Arab*, p. 63-64, in Din Syamsuddin, "Islam dan Politik Era Orde Baru," *Kata Pengantar* (Jakarta: Logos Wacana Ilmu, 2001), p. x; Muhammad Yusuf Musa, *Nizhâm al-Hukm fî al-Islâm* (Kairo: Dâr al-Kitâb al-'Arabî, 1963), p. 18.

<sup>2</sup> Expressions with such tendencies can be found in various symbolic terms that are currently popular, such as Islamic Revivalism, Islamic Awakening, Islamic Revolution or Islamic Fundamentalism. In Arkoun's view, such movements are consciously supported by groups who enjoy favourable social and economic positions so that they are willing to compromise and adopt conservative Islamic views because they do not have access to the modernity of thought. See Mohammed Arkoun, "The Concepts of Authority in Islamic Thought," in Klaus Ferdinand and Mehdi Mozaffari (eds.), *Islam: State and Society* (London: Curzon Press, 1988), p. 70-71.

<sup>3</sup> Complementary descriptions of it can be read, for example: Ahmad Syafi'i Maarif: *Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan: Studi tentang Percaturan dalam Konstituante* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985); B.J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971); Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998); Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional 1945-1965* (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Graffiti, 1987), and soon.

MPR, for example, there was another very strong attraction between groups wishing to reinstate the Jakarta Charter with other groups who had different views. In the community too, the demands to formally enforce Islamic law began to be voiced by several Muslim groups in various regions.<sup>4</sup> In the community too, the demand to formally enforce Islamic law began to be voiced by several Muslim groups<sup>5</sup> in various regions.<sup>6</sup>

In South Sulawesi, the idea was rolled out by the Islamic Sharia Enforcement Preparation Committee (*Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam - KPPSI*). As an area known as a fanatical Muslim, the emergence of such ideas in this area is not so surprising. Notably, in reality, KPPSI was not the first group to voice such ideas in this area. Previously, the DI/TII movement had emerged, which also carried the jargon of the struggle to uphold Islamic law.<sup>7</sup>

The initiators<sup>8</sup> Of the Islamic, Sharia Enforcement Preparation Committee (hereinafter written KPPSI) considered that since the New Order came to power, Muslims are a marginalized group. Therefore, the fall of the New Order in 1998 should not be let go by, because it is the right momentum for the rise of Muslims. KPPSI then took the initiative to appear at the forefront to fight for the demands of the application of Islamic law in this area.

---

<sup>4</sup> The discourse and desire to revive the Jakarta Charter had once arisen and was fought for by Muslim politicians before and during the 1999 MPR General Session and the 2000 Annual Session, such as Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang - PBB), United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan - PPP), Daulat Ummat Party (PDU), Muslim Ummah Party (Partai Umat Islam - PUI), and Ummah Awakening Party (Partai Daulat Ummat - PKU), see also Mukrimin, "Islamic parties and the Politics of constitutionalism in Indonesia", *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, volume 6, number 2, 2012, p. 2900-2904; see also Jeremy Menchik, *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 5.

<sup>5</sup> Just to mention several examples, among groups who want the enforcement of Islamic law are the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia - MMI), the Ahlussunnah Waljamaah Communication Forum, the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam - FPI), the Indonesian Committee for Islamic World Solidarity (Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam - KISDI), and others.

<sup>6</sup> Other areas that are also known for the idea of enforcement of Islamic law are Banten, Pamekasan, Sumenep, Gresik, Malang, Garut, and Cianjur.

<sup>7</sup> For the national coverage of DI, see Andi Rahman Alamsyah & Vedi R. Hadiz, *Three Islamist Generations, one Islamic state: the Darul Islam movement and Indonesian social transformation*, *Critical Asian Studies*, 49(1), 2017, p. 55.

<sup>8</sup> Of the idea for the formation of KPPSI included Aziz Qahar Muzakkar, Agus Dwikarna, Azwar Hasan, Zaitun Rasmin, and others. Their ideas were also supported by Muslim intellectuals including (the late) Prof. Dr H. Mattulada, Prof. Dr Ahmad Ali, Prof. Dr Abu Hamid, (the late) Prof. Dr H. Abdurrahman A. Basalamah, and others.

The organization, which was declared in October 2000, focused its struggle on demand for special autonomy for the implementation of Islamic law in South Sulawesi, as was the case in the Province of Aceh, which had received approval from the central government. In the Muqaddimah, the recommendation of the struggle of KPPSI stated that philosophically, historically and sociologically, the enforcement of Islamic law in this area is a must as well as the historical task of Muslims.<sup>9</sup>

For proponents who supported the KPPSI, historically Islam has always been the religion of the kings and their people in this area, becoming the basis of orientation and way of life. That is why South Sulawesi was then labelled "*Serambi Madinah*" (the Verandah of Madinah).<sup>10</sup> Sociologically, the fact that the majority of the population of South Sulawesi is Muslim is a strong reason to support that idea. The fact that the legal system applied so far has proven ineffective in resolving the problems of the Ummah, for KPPSI supporters to be used as a philosophical reason to strengthen their ideas.

This paper is focused on the historical and sociological arguments that occur in South Sulawesi. This paper is expected to be useful to broaden the horizon of Islamic politics. In this regard, Muslim understanding is not only concentrated on one idea which the fundamental reasons are still debatable is expected to be able to think of the constraints and limitations faced concerning the heterogeneity of life South Sulawesi Muslims are dealing with Republic of Indonesia state policies. This section also presupposes that Muslims are willing to renew their struggle strategy, so that the political experience of Islam in Indonesia in general, which has much history, is coloured by a counter-antagonistic atmosphere - not only with the state but also with other Muslims -, no longer happening, without forgetting guidance moral and ethical values taught by Islam.

---

<sup>9</sup> See, *Hasil-Hasil Keputusan Kongres Umat Islam Sulawesi Selatan*, Makassar, 19-21 Oktober 2000/21-23 Rajab 1421 M, p. 6.

<sup>10</sup> According to Ahmad M. Sewang (Muslim historian of South Sulawesi), the term *Serambi Madinah* was first known after the G-30 S / PKI incident when the atmosphere of people's lives at that time was filled with fear of being labelled by the government as PKI minions. Among the efforts to free themselves from these suspicions, the Muslims in this area then made closeness to religious aspects as a choice because it was practically contrary to the teachings of the atheist PKI. Nevertheless, in later developments, some suggested that the choice be associated with the name Veranda of Medina as a counterpart to the title given to Aceh as the Veranda of Mecca. Interview with Ahmad M Sewang in Makassar, May 17, 2003. Nevertheless, for some people, the term is still not widespread and therefore still needs more in-depth study, primarily if it is then used as one of the steps in demanding the application of Islamic law in this area, as is the case in Aceh. Interview with Minhajuddin (Islamic religious leader), Makassar, May 18, 2003.

### Historical Arguments for Sharia Enforcement in South Sulawesi

The emergence of the idea of upholding Islamic law in South Sulawesi as championed by KPPSI in the reform order as it is today is not something new in Muslim communities in this area. A group of Muslims had previously fought such an idea in this area during the Old Order who called themselves the Darul Islam, the Indonesian Islamic Army (*Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia - DI/TII*) group.<sup>11</sup> Even though the nuances of thought and orientation of the struggle were different from those currently supported by KPPSI supporting actors, the emergence of the DI/TII movement beforehand was still interesting to mention.

In the history of South Sulawesi, the emergence of the Darul Islam Movement or the Indonesian Islamic Army (*Gerakan Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia – DI/TII*) in the 1950s was led by Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar.<sup>12</sup> The movement that lasted from 1950-1965, although in reality it was often regarded as only a form of disappointment for a group of soldiers whose aspirations were not given much attention to the central government at that time;<sup>13</sup> However, in reality, the issue at that time was also oriented towards efforts to uphold Islamic law in South Sulawesi by forming a demarcation area in which Islamic law was applied as a basis for decision making, in accordance with their concepts and understanding of the Shari'a itself.

---

<sup>11</sup> Although history tells us that since the age of the kingdom in this area Islamic sharia has been enacted, then if this section is limited explicitly to tracing during the DI/TII period, then it is not intended to behead the historical event. However, it was solely intended to seek an adequate explanation of the accusations raised in the community that the emergence of KPPSI was a new form of the DI/TII struggle. The community's assumptions were mainly built from the fact that in various activities carried out by KPPSI, many were attended by old figures of former DI/TII and their families, especially with the election of Asiz Qahhar (youngest son of Qahhar Mudzakkar) as Chair of the KPPSI Tanfidziyah Lajnah.

<sup>12</sup> The name Qahhar Mudzakkar is often found in many versions. Sometimes it is written with Kahar Muzakkar, Kahar Mudzakkar, Qahar Muzakkar, Kahar Mudzakkar and others. However, based on his own admission, the truth is Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar. He explained in detail; Abdul means Servant, Qahhar means the mighty, Mudzakkar means male. So, Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar means male servant of God, see Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, *Tjatatatan Bathin Pedjoang Islam Revolusioner*, Jilid III (Singapura: Qalam Press, 1382 H), p. 113. Furthermore, the name Qahhar Mudzakkar must be done carefully, because some writers liken it to Kiyai Haji Abdul Kahar Mudzakkar. For example, it says: "Especially Ki Bagus Hadikusumo and Kahar Muzakkar (who would later become terrorist leaders of the Darul Islam of South Sulawesi) ... For this reason, see Pipitseptra, *Beberapa Aspek dari Sejarah Indonesia Aliran Nasionalis, Islam, Katolik sampai Akhir Zaman Perbedaan Paham* (Ende-Flores: Nusa Indah, 1973), p. 304. Pipitseptra's statement was clearly invalid because Abdul Kahar Muzakkar was a signatory figure of the Djakarta Charter who never rebelled.

<sup>13</sup> Anhar Gonggong, *Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar: Dari Patriot hingga Pemberontak* (Jakarta: Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, 1992), p. 94-97.

If our attention paid to the development process of the Qahar Mudzakkar movement, then there appear to be two stages of making Islam the ideology of the movement. The first phase, from 1950-1953, which Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar referred to as a time of mobilization and a transition period;<sup>14</sup> dan tahap kedua dari tahun 1953-1965 yang diistilahkan sendiri oleh Qahhar Mudzakkar dengan Revolusi Islam.<sup>15</sup>

In Qahhar's view, the community had experienced the damage he termed as "swimmer check" ("*centang perenang*").<sup>16</sup> The global community groups at that time, such as liberalism, fake communism and religious world groups (outside of Islam) were regarded as factors that damage the world community.<sup>17</sup>

He put it in this way:

... "Liberalism world-class became drunk and forgot the land, fearing and dragging humans with the "nuclear" results of the technical ingenuity of the ratio. The Communist world group went crazy and forgot the land, fearing and dragging people into the "realm of animal association" with the "nuclear" threat of technical results with rational intelligence as well. The world group of Gadungan Nationalism is fueling the spirit of greed and greed nationality, the spirit of nationalism is narrow and narrow, throwing religion outside the fence of the State, inciting people to rebel and fighting endlessly. The world-class of Religion (outside of Islam), which denies the Oneness of God, such as Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, and so on. Becoming confused with the religious conviction, because they associate the Lord Jang Almighty, and cause them to live adrift in a world of doubt, "is doubt over the truth of Agamanja, doubt over the power of human-personified spirits, doubt over the authority of human spirits, and doubt over all the Gods and statues they prayed to."<sup>18</sup>

After giving his analysis like that, Qahhar mentioned that only Islam could improve the situation of the world community. With his belief in the truth of Islam, he argues as follows:

"The teachings of Islam carried by the Prophet Muhammad are much broader, more complete, more perfect, (covering human life in the world and hereafter), than the Adoration of the Prophet Musa (peace be upon him) in the Torah and the Adjunct of the Prophet Jesus (peace be upon him) in the Gospels. The Islamic teachings brought by the Prophet Muhammad covered all layers of the Human Ummah on the entire surface of the

---

<sup>14</sup> Qahhar Mudzakkar, "Tjatatan Bathin," *op. cit.*, jilid I, p. 11.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> The term that he intended to describe the situation of the world community that was hit by the crisis of chaos at that time was used by Qahhar in various writings. See for example another book: *Revolusi Ketatanegaraan Indonesia Menuju Persaudaraan Manusia* (Makassar: Hasanuddin University Press, 1381 H), p. 21; "Tjatatan Bathin," *op. cit.*, jilid III, p. 11, and others.

<sup>17</sup> A description of the classification of the world community as intended above, see "Tjatatan Bathin," *ibid.*, p. 11-41.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10-11.

Earth, while the religion of Judaism and Christianity was only devoted by God to the Children of Israel.”<sup>19</sup>

Based on his opinion, he made the teachings of Islam as the foundation of his movement and was not only intended for the Indonesian people, but also for world peace. In his letter to President Sukarno, it was stated that efforts to fight for world peace without moral force and without religious teachings, were in vain.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, in the interpretation of Qahhar Mudzakkar, neither capitalist liberalism nor forced communism can possibly save the world community.<sup>21</sup>

In its interpretation, the world problem faced today is not the advance of socialism-communism to replace capitalism-liberalism, but the growth of the spirit of human unity in the form of demands for self-determination. Departing from such a line of thought, Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar advocated what he called *Ichwatunism*, a term derived from QS al-Hujurat verse 10 which reads: *Innamal Mu'minuna Ichwatun ...* which means: “Those who truly believe in God are “brothers.”<sup>22</sup> The teachings he advocated, according to Qahhar, were the spirit of Islamic nationalism that had been neglected by the religious scholars and leaders of the Islamic world. That caused the Muslim community throughout the world to become paralyzed. Because of the neglect of “*Ichwatunism*” by the religious scholars and leaders of the Islamic world:

... “[T]hen the Islamic Ummah group is involved in rioting, making patchy matters of statehood, eliminating religion from the state and participating in seeking the structure of the state system, tracing the composition of the “fake nationality” system which is chaotic outside Islam, as happened in Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Iran, Iraq and so on”.<sup>23</sup>

Based on such beliefs, Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar invited President Sukarno to become an advocate of world peace based on Islamic teachings. The invitation was conveyed in one of his letters:

Bung Karno, whom I respected!

“How happy and great our nation is under the leadership of Bung Karno if now and now Bung Karno as the great leader of Islam, the great leader of the Indonesian people, comes forward to appeal to the world community which is being feared by World War III, feared by the Nuclear power, returned to the road peace and peace which is indicated by God in

---

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 39.

<sup>20</sup> Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, “Revolusi”, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 74.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 76.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

all of its precepts which are in the Book of Sutji al-Qur'an and in the Books of Other Religion Sutji."<sup>24</sup>

After inviting President Sukarno to appear as a world figure who called for peace in accordance with Islamic teachings, Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar showed the way. According to him, the straightforward way was "to replace Pantjasila with the Philosophy of God."<sup>25</sup> The complete sound of the decree proposed by Qahhar to Sukarno through his letter was to replace Pancasila with The Islamic Adjunct and the Other Religious Admissions, which were adopted by all Indonesian tribes."<sup>26</sup>

Because of his strong acceptance and belief in the truth of Islam, during his leadership of the Darul Islam / Indonesian Islamic Army movement in the South Sulawesi region, Qahhar Mudzakkar enforced Shari'a laws in total accordance with his understanding and their natural form.

During the implementation of Islamic law at that time, the level of crime and disobedience in society can indeed be minimized, as explicitly stated by Ja'far Sanusi. At length, the cleric figure who was once the Chair of the Ulema Council in one of the districts in South Sulawesi compared the level of disobedience and criminality that occurred in the community when Islamic Sharia was enacted or not.<sup>27</sup>

Although it is possible that when the DI / TII movement came to power, the level of crime committed by community members can be minimized, but other phenomena are very paradoxical with Ja'far's argument. As stated by Anhar Gonggong, it was during the DI / TII period that various forms of crimes were committed, both to the soul and property committed by followers of the DI / TII movement.<sup>28</sup> Crimes against the soul are mainly committed against those who openly display an attitude of disloyalty towards the movement, while crimes in the form of robbery, theft and the like are committed to secure food supplies for the continuation of the struggle.

If these deviant behaviours are connected with the mission of the struggle they are touting, namely the struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state in which Islamic Sharia is implemented, then for reasons that are easily understood, such movements will not get sympathy and support. Indeed, the people of South Sulawesi at that time were patterned in groups that were pro and contra. Those who are pro are generally groups of people who feel they have benefited from the movement, both directly and indirectly. However, the majority of the population still considers the movement only as a splinter

---

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup> Interview, Ja'far Sanusi (Ulama), Pinrang: 2 July 2017.

<sup>28</sup> Anhar Gonggong, *op. cit.*, p. 57.



movement, which fights for and or in the name of Islam not because of ideological awareness alone, but more because of social and political factors.

Therefore, too, when the TNI successfully paralyzed the movement in 1965, the people of South Sulawesi welcomed it joyfully, and even during the process of suppressing the movement, there was no lack of assistance given by the population to the TNI to accelerate its crackdown.<sup>29</sup>

The phenomenon of community involvement, if interpreted, would mean that the issue of enforcement of Islamic law which was rolled out by DI / TII at that time did not get sympathy and community support, despite the fact that the majority of the people of South Sulawesi when it was a traditionally Muslim group, in the most general sense.

It is possible because of the bitter experience that the South Sulawesi people had just experienced at that time so that when there was a change of regime from the Old Order to the New Order, the issues presented by Muslim groups seeking support were no longer in the hearts of the people. That feels right by paying attention to the vote acquisition of Islamic parties in the elections conducted during the New Order.

The decline saw the political defeat of Islam in support of Muslims in this area to Islamic parties in every election. Even though in the 1950 elections, for example, the Masyumi Islamic party received majority support of 39.7%, followed by NU with 17.2%. However, in the 1971 election, which was attended by ten contestants, Golkar controlled all the battles in South Sulawesi.<sup>30</sup> Practically there had been no longer visible traces of the triumph of Islamic parties that influence the power since the 1955 general election. Masyumi, which used to lead the vote, even suffered a lethal blow earlier after it was dissolved in 1960.<sup>31</sup> The NU party, which succeeded at number three at the national level and number two in the province, became the only Islamic party that could still survive among the onslaught of the Golkar Party. Pada pemilu 1977, kala peserta pemilu hanya tiga, suara Golkar semakin kuat dengan rentang perolehan dari 55,7 % hingga 99,9 %. This was also the case with subsequent elections conducted during the New Order

---

<sup>29</sup> As was echoed by KH Latif Amin, a figure who became an eyewitness during the DI/TII movement said that since the DI/TII movement took place; the community did not feel sympathy because of the actions of their followers who often worried the population. Therefore, there is a government policy to crush the movement and immediately get a response from the public. One expression of the welcome was providing assistance in the form of valuable information about the existence of the group and by breaking the food supply chain, so that the movement's food supply was disrupted, although for this reason, the community had to bear the risk of robbery of the people's food products — author's interview with K.H. Latif Amin, Bone: 24 July 2015.

<sup>30</sup> See "Peta Politik Pemilihan Umum Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan," *Kompas*, 26 February 2004, p. 32.

<sup>31</sup> Sukarno dissolved Masyumi in 1960 because several of its foremost leaders (such as Mohammad Natsir and Safruddin Prawiranegara) who were involved in the PRRI Rebellion. See Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional 1945-1965* (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Graffiti, 1987), p. 349-357.

government. Golkar Might even endure. The fall of the Suharto regime with Golkar as its political engine did not dampen the confidence of the people of South Sulawesi in Golkar. The banyan party won 66.5% of defeating old rival parties and new parties. PPP became the second most popular choice after Golkar with 8.4% of the votes, followed by the PDI with 6.6%. PAN became the newcomer party with the most significant vote despite only recording 3.5%. Besides PAN, other parties that received little support were PKB (1.6%), PBB (1.4%) and IPKI party (1.3%).<sup>32</sup> The 2004 legislative elections also showed results that were not much different, namely that Golkar was able to win majority support with a gain of up to 60.5%.

As an area with a robust Islamic basis, the data above shows that the so-called Muslims do not automatically become supporters of Islamic parties. On the other hand, this fact also shows that the ideological affinity of Muslims to Islamic parties is apparently not strong, on the contrary, the claims of Islamic parties as the sole channelling of people's aspirations - as they often appear in election campaigns - are challenging to accept and do not correspond to reality in fact.

The fact that since the 1980s the PPP party was marked by severe internal conflict has also caused the party not only to lose prestige but also reduce its credibility as an Islamic party. It is not surprising then that many Muslims themselves became less sympathetic to this party.<sup>33</sup>

Apart from these problems, one thing is almost certain that the decline of Muslim support for the most part - not to mention everything - is motivated by the carrying out of engineering and ideological offensive<sup>34</sup> New Order politics such as political restructuring, depoliticization, floating mass politics, and so on.

Apart from the bureaucratic politics, which is carried out strictly by the government, by looking at political developments in the previous decade, it seems that among Muslims themselves there has been a significant shift in thought.<sup>35</sup> Repeated

---

<sup>32</sup> See Voting for the 1999 Election in the Province of South Sulawesi, in "Kompas," *loc. cit.*

<sup>33</sup> Syamsuddin Haris, *PPP dan Politik Orde Baru* (Jakarta: Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, 1991), p. 152.

<sup>34</sup> The term "ideological offensive" was put forward by Taufik Abdullah in his book *Islam dan Masyarakat: Pantulan Sejarah Indonesia* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1987), p. 40.

<sup>35</sup> For the recent bureaucratization of Islam, see Dominik M. Müller & Kerstin Steiner, The Bureaucratization of Islam in Southeast Asia: Transdisciplinary Perspectives, *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 37 (1), 2018.

failures in the political arena, the development of religious fields which are factually beneficial to Muslims, religious politics that are more accommodating to the aspirations of Muslims and so on, are factors that contribute to a shift in thinking among Muslims. In other words, because the situation is so far apart, the Muslims have begun to redefine and reformulate their existence and political position in the face of new developments, which they feel are different from previous periods.

This shift in thinking had an impact on the weakening of the remnants of the past Islamic political leadership, including their attitude towards Islamic figures. The influence of these Islamic figures, borrowing the term Fachri Ali, "although still respected, has completely been emptied of the political consciousness space of the people, especially among those who have been sacrificed."<sup>36</sup>

Such a view is accurate, mainly if it is associated with the acceptance of the Muslim community in this area towards past Islamic figures. Regarding the figure of Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, for example, who once gave rise to the idea of an Islamic state through its DI / TII movement, for the present context there is only very limited sympathy for specific regions, especially the Luwu region which has become the socio-cultural basis of the figure. While in other areas, his figure is considered controversial; some even consider him an opportunistic figure.

This opportunistic impression among the people of South Sulawesi was based on their understanding that the initial impetus for the DI / TII rebellion did not emerge from the theological-political awareness of the leaders and their supporters. There seems to have originated from the military policy of the central government that cannot be accepted by the ex-guerrillas fighters in this area. They demanded to be included in a specific block in the line of national armies formed at the time and wanted a separate military unit. Kawilarang, who was then serving as the Military Commander for Eastern Indonesia, refused the request. As he dismissed most of the ex-guerrillas' soldiers, he only wanted a small number of those chosen to be included in the TNI unit. Qahhar Mudzakkar (who was then in Java and was one of the charismatic guerrilla army leaders) was called home

---

<sup>36</sup> Fachry Ali, "Akomodasi Non-Politik Islam Indonesia dalam Struktur Orde Baru," *Prisma*, No. 3, Tahun XX, Maret 1991, p. 194.

and asked to mediate the conflict. After feeling that his efforts were not bearing fruit, he even joined in and led the resistance of the former guerrillas above.<sup>37</sup>

A short time later, this military resistance turned into open political separation from the concept of a unitary state as defined by the central government at that time. Only at this level of resistance did Qahhar Mudzakar contact Kartosuwiryo and accept his appointment as "TII commander for the South Sulawesi region," and it becomes "the part of Kartosuwiryo's NII in West Java."<sup>38</sup>

The events that lasted for fifteen years (from 1950-1965), apparently left a less sympathetic impression among the people. The behaviour of the leaders and supporters of the DI/TII movement when it was not infrequently committing crimes against souls and property and honour, felt the community was contradictory to the jargon of their struggle, namely the desire to establish an Islamic state with the implementation of Islamic law in it.

Because of the less sympathetic impression, when a similar idea reappears, namely the desire to uphold Islamic law as initiated by KPPSI, public opinion, especially in rural areas, is drawn back to the old idea. With a slightly suspicious tone, some even claim the idea as something to watch out for, even hostile.<sup>39</sup>

Apart from the general description of the lack of adequate appreciation of such ideas and the accompanying issues, it is clear that there have indeed been changes of mind among Muslims in South Sulawesi to no longer immediately support ideas in the name of religion without concrete actions, which is felt to be of direct benefit to them. Golkar's victory in every election in this area that was previously a conventional supporter of Islamic parties can be used as a reason to strengthen the conclusion that there have been intensive and striking ideological shifts and changes among Muslims in this area. The choice of Golkar was clearly based on the fact that this party, which according to them at

---

<sup>37</sup> Complementary descriptions of the DI / TII Rebellion in South Sulawesi, see for example, B.J Boland, "The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia," translated by Saffroeddin Bahar: *Pergumulan Islam di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Graffiti Press, 1985); Anhar Gonggong, *Abdul Qahhar Mudzakar: Dari Patriot Hingga Pemberontak* (Jakarta: Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, 1992).

<sup>38</sup> See B.J Boland, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

<sup>39</sup> Such views, the authors extract from informal conversations with communities in Pinrang District. Although in a limited amount and may be considered unable to represent the population of South Sulawesi society in general, such views also cannot be ignored. Even the same impression, the author also found in some areas, although for that, it is no longer done in an organized manner.

the time had all the requirements, needed to improve their welfare. However, that does not mean that political Islam has disappeared altogether. Even though it has declined, it still has fanatical supporters among certain Muslims, especially groups that have primordial ties to the old Islamic political leadership.

### **The Philosophical and Sociological Arguments of Enforcement of Islamic Sharia in South Sulawesi**

Apart from historical reasons by considering the history of Islam in this area, the emergence of a desire to uphold Islamic law according to its initiator is also based on philosophical and sociological reasons.

Philosophically and sociologically, the fact that the system applied so far has proven ineffective in solving various existing problems. The system should be a reference: that it is time to think about the implementation of a new system that is believed to be effective in resolving various existing problems.

In Abdurrahman Basalamah's view, for example, one of the main causes of the crisis that has engulfed all aspects of people's lives today is mainly due to moral decadence. This was reflected in public service activities due to corruption, collusion, and nepotism. This is exacerbated by the law enforcement system, which is still very weak, apart from the fact that the legal substance here and there is still limited and part of it is still a colonial legacy, as well as law enforcement officials are still weak, especially in terms of morals. Very excited, he expressed his conviction that more than 90% of the people of South Sulawesi were dissatisfied with the positive law that had been in force so far.

According to Abdurrahman Basalamah, the swiftness of un-Islamic values that are rolling in the community further strengthens the demand for the establishment of Islamic law. South Sulawesi, which is known as a religious area today, is no different from other regions. Influence is rampant; tyranny is everywhere, and so on. Only the establishment of Islamic law can overcome it all. Comment Basalamah who is also the Chairperson of the Indonesian Muslim University Foundation Waqf Foundation (*Yayasan Badan Wakaf Universitas Muslim Indonesia*).

In line with Basalamah, Ahmad Ali (Professor of Law at Hasanuddin University) philosophically describes the current state of the law in Indonesia. According to him, today, the level of citizens' trust in positive law is getting lower. That was caused by the public witnessing and knowing the existence of judicial mafia practices. Existing law and justice institutions can no longer be the last bastion for justice seekers. So sometimes, the community acts vigilantly in solving the cases it faces. Consequently, instead of crime can be suppressed, even more widespread.

Therefore, as a first step to reduce the outbreak of violence due to the reduced level of public trust in the government and law enforcement, it is essential to restore the confidence of citizens in the law and law enforcement.<sup>40</sup> What law? Of course, laws that are in accordance with the intrinsic value of the citizens of their communities. He added, the intrinsic value embraced by religious people certainly is the best choice for them. Moreover, for a Muslim, that choice is none other than the enforcement of Islamic law.<sup>41</sup>

Similar view held by Angregurutta M Nur Muhammad, when he explained the issue of the function of the Shari'a in social life so that it must be formalized, by quoting the opinions of experts ushul fiqh explained that the function of the Shari'a is to protect and guarantee the safety and security and welfare of mankind, which includes five basic demands called maqhásid al-syariat which include: (1) *hifz al-din*, guaranteeing the freedom of people to have a religion, (2) *hifz al-nasl*, guaranteeing the sanctity of heredity, (3) *hifz al-'aql*, protecting the mind from influences that damage the functioning of reason in human life, (4) *hidz al-nafs*, protect and guarantee human safety, and (5) *hifz al-mâl*, guarantee and protect human material rights.

For Nur Muhammad, this kind of sharia function can never be matched by secular law. Because in reality, secular law totally ignores the essential factors, which are the domain of religion.

... “[t]hat's why humans have been given basic guidelines to make the necessary rules and laws if there is no text in the Koran and the Sunnah, with their *ijtihad*, as long as it still refers

---

<sup>40</sup> Ahmad Ali, "Penegakan Syariat Islam (Suatu Tinjauan Sosiologi Hukum)", Unpublished *paper presented at the National Seminar on Enforcement of Islamic Sharia through Special Autonomy in Terms of Various Aspects* (Makassar, 22 June 2001), p. 7.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

to the five principles. Because of this, Muslims in South Sulawesi can only live well and make meaningful contributions, if Islamic law can be enforced in this area.”<sup>42</sup>

In the line of thought as stated by its initiators, KPPSI - as concretely stated by Sirajuddin (Secretary of the Shura Council of KPPSI) – who called for the implementation of Islamic law in *kaffah* by involving the government in its implementation. The following excerpts Sirajuddin's view about the implementation of Islamic law comprehensively (*kaffah*):

Carrying out Islamic law in full and comprehensive (*kaffah*) is a collective obligation and responsibility of every believer; (2) Intentions in carrying out some Islamic Shari'a and rejecting some others will lead to the narrowness of life in the world and the punishment of Allah in the hereafter; (3) The Islamic Sharia enforcement is the peak of the struggle of the Muslims as God intended to deliver the glory of human life; (4) The enforcement of Islamic Shari'a in a *kaffah* is a concrete form of piety to Allah Almighty and becomes the solution of all crises and problems of human life.<sup>43</sup>

Furthermore, rather emotionally, Sirajuddin rejected the assumption of some circles who said that the application of Islamic law was described as an orientation of the past and the desert community. According to him, these expressions are a mirror of Islamophobia that has entered into the minds of Muslims.

... “why are Muslims worried about Sharia law which is their religious law? Muslims are worried about clear and standard religious laws but are not worried about Western laws that are still patchy and have proven ineffective at solving problems. Today, Muslims tend to accept laws that are enforced nationally but reject laws that are enacted sharply”.<sup>44</sup>

According to another KPPSI figure, Aswar Hasan, the fear of some circles about the implementation of Islamic law is groundless. It is partly because if one wants to be honest with the history of this nation, surely you will not evade the fact that the life of this nation is imbued with the Jakarta Charter. In fact, when the Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959, was rolled out by Sukarno, the Jakarta Charter was said to animate the 1945

---

<sup>42</sup> Interview with KH M Nur Muhammad, Makassar: 20 March 2017.

<sup>43</sup> Among a number of KPPSI figures, such as, Sirajuddin who were the most active in disseminating KPPSI ideas through his writings. Several writings he published in the internal circles of KPPSI much helped the writer in understanding the direction and objectives of the KPPSI struggle. His position as Secretary of the KPPSI Shura Council was organizationally strategic, making it possible to scrutinize the wheels of the organization. Therefore, perhaps it is not excessive if a number of his writings on KPPSI can be claimed to represent the true colours of KPPSI, especially so far, there have been no complaints from KPPSI figures about these writings.

<sup>44</sup> Interview with Sirajuddin, Makassar: 15 July 2017.

Constitution. In addition, in Indonesia alone, the Jakarta Charter had become the first constitution ratified by the founders of this Republic. The KPPSI Advisory Board Member believes:

“If the Jakarta Charter is included in the Constitution, then Muslims will have a constitutional footing if they wish to convey their aspirations. During this time, every Muslim voice the Jakarta Charter, always declared contrary to the Constitution, Pancasila and government policies.”<sup>45</sup>

Enthusiastically; but regrettably, Aswar Hasan said that existing Muslim leaders no longer had a strong commitment to making this happen, as had been shown by Islamic leaders in the BPUPKI and PPKI sessions.<sup>46</sup> “In his analysis, if the Charter Jakarta has been successfully included in the amendments to the 1945 Constitution, so KPPSI no longer needs to ask for a legal umbrella in the form of special autonomy for the implementation of Islamic law.

Finally, one commentator put it succinctly in this way: Not surprisingly, the main point on the KPPSI’s agenda was the incorporation of Sharia-inspired regulations into the legal system of South Sulawesi. Politically, the kppsi took, and still takes, an anti-New Order and anti-corruption stance. Sharia will increase law and order, so the argument goes. Moreover, the KPPSI argued that the Sharia policy for Aceh has opened up the legal possibility for a further ‘shariatization’ of regions with a traditionally strong Islamic character.<sup>47</sup>

## **Conclusion**

Although it is true that both historically and philosophically-sociologically, the arguments underlying the desire to enforce Islamic law are largely normatively justified, but the fact that there is no political situation can be interpreted as a fundamental justification for demanding the idea, making the idea still limited to discourse. Especially if then the struggle in that direction is pursued through political mechanisms too, with the

---

<sup>45</sup> Interview with Aswar Hasan, Makassar: 30 April 2017.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> Stijn Cornelis van Huis, “The Islamic Court of Bulukumba and Women’s Access to Divorce and Post-Divorce Rights”. In Kees van Dijk and Nico J.G. Kaptein (eds.) *Islam, Politics and Change: The Indonesian Experience after the Fall of Suharto*, (Leiden: Leiden University Press), 2016, p. 169-171.



demand for a legal umbrella in the form of special autonomy, then the idea seems to be less popular.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the emergence of KPPSI was more due to euphoric reasons among its supporters. It is, arguably, a backlash against the long political experiences of Muslims whose history leaves more grim stories.

At the same time, the idea was triggered by a crisis that gave birth to frustration and a sense of oppression that manifested itself in the form of a large number of abuses of power by the elite and caused widespread corruption, political crime, weak law enforcement, and economic powerlessness. At the community level, the crisis took the form of increasing crime, fading social solidarity and rampant immorality. This has a direct effect on the decline in the legitimacy of the existing secular-based political and legal system. Then came the desire to return to alternative values and systems based on Islam.

Eventually, it becomes the most critical *raison d'être* of the revival of religious movements such as KPPSI. If in reality, the movement emerged after the collapse of the New Order, then it was more because the era did provide sufficient space for the emergence of old and new ideas in an era marked by a climate of openness.

## REFERENCES

- Abdullah, Taufik. *Islam dan Masyarakat: Pantulan Sejarah Indonesia*, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1987.
- Al-Asymawi, Muhammad Sa'id. *al-Islâm al-Siyâsî*. Kairo: Dâr al-'Arabiyah li al-Thibâ'ah wa al-Nasyr, 1987.
- Al-Na'im, Abdullah Ahmed. 1996. *Toward Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights and International Law*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Alamsyah, Andi Rahman & Hadiz, Vedi R., Three Islamist generations, one Islamic state: the Darul Islam movement and Indonesian social transformation, *Critical Asian Studies*, 49:1, 54-72, 2017. DOI: 10.1080/14672715.2016.1260887.
- Ali, Ahmad. "Penegakan Syariat Islam (Suatu Tinjauan Sosiologi Hukum)," Paper presented at the Seminar Nasional Penegakan Syariat Islam Melalui Otonomi Khusus Ditinjau dari Berbagai Aspek, Makassar, 22 June 2001.
- Ali, Fachry. "Akomodasi Non-Politik Islam Indonesia dalam Struktur Orde Baru," *Prisma*, No. 3, XX, March 1991.

- Anwar, M. Syafii. *Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam: Sebuah Kajian Politik Tentang Cendekiawan Muslim Orde Baru*, First Edition; Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995.
- Arkoun, Mohammed. "The Concepts of Authority in Islamic Thought," in Klaus Ferdinand and Mehdi Mozaffari (eds.), *Islam: State and Society*, London: Curzon Press, 1988.
- Boland, B. J. *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, Translated by Safroeddin Bahar *Pergumulan Islam di Indonesia*, Jakarta: Graffiti Press, 1985.
- Coulson, Noel J. *Hukum Islam dalam Perspektif Sejarah*. Jakarta: P3M, 1987.
- Effendy, Bahtiar. "Islam dan Politik Era Orde Baru," *Kata Pengantar* (Jakarta: Logos Wacana Ilmu, 2001).
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia*, Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998.
- Gibb, H.A.R. (ed.), *Whither Islam? A Survey of Modern Movement in The Moslem World*. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., ND.
- Gonggong, Anhar. *Abdul Qahhar Muzakkar: Dari Patriot hingga Pemberontak*, Jakarta: Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, 1992.
- Haris, Syamsuddin. *PPP dan Politik Orde Baru*, Jakarta: Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, 1991.
- Hodgson, Marshall G.S. *The Venture of Islam*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974.
- Hosen, Nadirsyah. Religion and the Indonesia Constitution: A Recent Debate. *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 36(3): 419-440, 2005. Doi: 10.1017/S0022463405000238.
- Ka'bah, Rifyal. "Syariat Islam di Aceh dalam Kerangka Negara Kesatuan RI," dalam M Thalib Puspokusumo (ed.), *Reformasi Hukum di Indonesia: Sebuah Keniscayaan*. Jakarta: Tim Pakar Hukum Departemen Kehakiman dan HAM, 1999.
- KPSI, *Hasil-Hasil Keputusan Kongres Umat Islam Sulawesi Selatan*, Makassar, 19-21 Oktober, 2000.
- Lapidus, Ira M. *A History of Islamic Societies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Maarif, Ahmad Syafi'i. *Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan: Studi tentang Percaturan dalam Konstituante*, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985.
- Mahfudh MD, Moh. *Politik Hukum di Indonesia*. Cet I. Jakarta: LP3ES, 1988.
- Menchik, Jeremy. *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- Muzakkar, Abdul Qahhar. *Revolusi Ketatanegaraan Indonesia Menuju Persaudaraan Manusia*, Makassar: Hasanuddin University Press, 1381 H.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Tjataan Bathin Pedjoang Islam Revolutioner*, Jilid III, Singapura: Qalam Press, 1382 H.

- Mukrimin. Islamic Parties and the Politics of Constitutionalism in Indonesia, *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, Volume 6, Number 2, Pp. 2892-2912, 2012.
- Müller, Dominik M., & Steiner, Kerstin. The Bureaucratisation of Islam in Southeast Asia: Transdisciplinary Perspectives, *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, Volume 37, Number 1, Pp. 3–26, 2018.
- Musa, Muhammad Yusuf. *Nizhâm al-Hukm fî al-Islâm* (Kairo: Dâr al-Kitâb al-‘Arabî, 1963.
- Noer, Deliar. *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional 1945-1965*, Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Graffiti, 1987.
- Pipitseputra, *Beberapa Aspek dari Sejarah Indonesia Aliran Nasionalis, Islam, Katolik sampai Akhir Zaman Perbedaan Paham*, Ende-Flores: Nusa Indah, 1973.
- Teti, Andrea & Mura, Andrea. “Islam and Islamism”, in Jeffrey Haynes (ed.) *Routledge Handbook of religion and Politics*, London & New York: Routledge, 2008.
- van Huis, Stijn Cornelis. “The Islamic Court of Bulukumba and Women’s Access to Divorce and Post-Divorce Rights”. In Kees van Dijk and Nico J.G. Kaptein (eds.) *Islam, Politics and Change: The Indonesian Experience after the Fall of Suharto*, (Pp. 167-193), Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2016.